CUBA: The resources of the opposition.
have no weapons, but of power resources, your service made by States and organizations with tools and means of long range, making war by other means.
hunger strikes and suicides justified by strong moral beliefs, ideological, patriotic or religious tend to impact the consciousness of people. From Bobby Sands and the other 10 young Irish Republican Army who died in British prisons in 1981, to the numerous cases of Basque prisoners and anarchists who protested in January due to the prison abuse or political manipulation of judicial and police apparatuses in Spain and France, the issue of hunger strike and its meaning is no longer present in the public arena in recent decades.
In this perspective, the case of Cuban dissident Orlando Zapata, who died on February 23 following a hunger strike, or your current follower, Guillermo Fariñas, are not unusual events. Zapata's death is a human tragedy, but that does not explain who has become a cause celebre. If it is understood in its context, something difficult in the downpour of opinion that flood the media, " need to step back from the news and examine some key issues. What are Cuban dissident groups? What is the current national and international political context of the island? What factors influence individual reactions of the political actors in Europe and the United States before the event? How does "international media" helps build the problem? What to expect from the Cuban policy toward dissidents?
microparties
These opposition groups are not essentially different from the Cuban exile community in methods and objectives. The most powerful anti-Castro organizations in Miami and New Jersey does not advocate war today bombings and armed groups. And exiled dissidents do not agree on everything (for example, support the U.S. embargo), but share a common goal (to replace the capitalist system for a model), a common ideological denominator (the anti-Castro and anti-socialism) and their allies (the United States , anti-Communist governments and parties in Europe and other countries).
Its political nature is not resolved with the word "mercenaries", as it is likely that many, even after receiving U.S. funds, are genuine ideological beliefs. Under the umbrella of "democratic convergence" of dissidents abound interests, personalities and trends, including "Social", but its axis of gravity tends to be center-right. Although this partly explains his lack of roots in Cuban society, the main cause of infeasibility is derived from two key policy gaps: leadership and legitimacy.
Unlike anti-communist organizations of the sixties, with a social and political base and a coherent ideology, the dissidents do not have an anchor in civil society: lack of influence in religious organizations or the working class, as in Poland ; of prestigious intellectuals, as in Czechoslovakia, a guarantee to combat hateful or corrupt regimes, as in Romania. If so, movements incarnate wide impact. They are not "civil society", but opposition microparties. Naturally
minorities play a political role, and that a small group can become a great social movement. So why did the dissidents do not call for broader sectors? Consider three main reasons.
First, most of his criticism of the system are already part of the debate among the other Cuban, socialist or not. Suppose that the dissenters are solitary and heroic voices who dare to point out errors and make claims to the government reveals ignorance about Cuba today. The disagreement is deployed today within (and outside) of the institutions, the intellectual movement, the various media, social organizations, religious and cultural, and political activism itself.
Second, their proposals do not constitute a coherent economic and political program, but a string of vague ideological slogans ("national reconciliation", "strengthening of civil society," "pluralism") and classic economic liberalization measures already known 20 years in Latin America. Take the Varela Project for a serious political reform plan based on the Constitution of 1992, did not read carefully; but above all do not know the scope of the issues in the real public debate: decentralization, participation and effective political control of the People on bureaucracy, reorganization and efficiency of economic operation, expansion of non-state sector, extension of co-operation, recovery income levels according to the work and purchasing power, so widespread subsidies and gratuities, new social policies to the most vulnerable, reflecting public opinion in media, broadening the areas of freedom of expression, the strengthening of constitutional order and law, real democratization of the institutions (including policies).
Third, it is very difficult for a Cuban (whether or not sympathize with Fidel and Raul Castro or share the socialist ideals) considered legitimate groups supported by U.S., European parties and the most powerful forces in exile, which careers as champions of democracy and freedom are not very convincing Cuban.
Instead of the above reasons, attributed the lack of support of dissidents to the effectiveness of the Cuban security apparatus (no doubt effective), and especially to ignorance, isolation, resignation and fear of the poor Cubans. This reasoning assumes colonial passivity and resignation as features of Cuban political culture, something difficult to prove from the history of the last two centuries.
POWER PANEL
So the current reaction in Europe and the United States responds to "lack of information? Let's see what the dissidents say about their intelligence centers in Havana? What is the value of its diplomats on leadership, ideological consistency, integrity, political viability of these groups? How do they judge (really) their own foreign correspondents on the island, which report their adventures each week, following a "claims the newspaper's management? If they report the same thing I tell myself, I imagine that these foreign ministries and commissions of Foreign Affairs are aware of the ground they walk on.
If so, the ringing declarations of governments and political parties do not respond to any civil society of Holguin and Santa Clara, but their own interests, partisan struggles and election strategies in their respective countries. No wonder, for one official is authorized to meet with the Cuban government is generally required that you meet with the dissidents. This ensures the media effect, that the opposition displayed as a trophy and the Government and helmet. If Guillermo Fariñas
other dissidents have hunger strike entered many times, why this resonance now? Overshadowed by the propaganda about the bloggers, dissidents returning to the fore by the death of Zapata, but especially in an international situation peculiar to the island. Despite its limited results, the dialogue between Washington and Havana has made more progress in the last year than in the previous 10, have resumed talks on migration and direct mail semiofficial groups explore avenues for cooperation in drug interdiction, without raising restrictions imposed by Bush in 2005, have become to grant visas to scholars and artists; currents in Congress seek to restore the freedom of Americans to travel to the island.
Moreover, despite the "common position" adopted in late 1996, the policy of the European Union, led by Spain, had improved the relationship with the government of Raul Castro since June 2008, lifted sanctions imposed in 2003. This change was also prompted by the growing ties between Cuba and the rest of the region, not just left of center governments, but others, like Mexico.
What could happen in private, they asked some experts for weeks, to interfere in this raprochment? The answer was immediate. Same that the incident of the planes in 1996, he again blamed the Cuban government's "responsibility" for this event "avoidable and cruel" (the death of a "prisoner of conscience"). The convenience to the interests that oppose the dialogue is obvious.
What's new in this old confrontation? The ostensible racialization media Zapata case, across the ideological spectrum: it was "a mason Afro-Cuban" (El Pais, Spain), "a black worker of 43 years (Cubaencuentro)," not black or mason "(Kaos en Network), "black, Palestinian opposition" (El Mundo, Spain) "A black mason ... victim of Marxist collectivism" (El Heraldo, Ecuador). In this resonance effect is compounded by the intensity and saturation of the subject. Only El Pais published over 20 articles and editorials in the first six days after the death of Zapata.
Apart from this unprecedented interest in "Afro-Cuban dissidents", the Parliament has reiterated the Government of the island to its request for "immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience." What is the consistency of this approach?
The first is that the handful of political prisoners among the dissenters is not for reasons of "conscience" or "criticizing the government, but by actively opposing the system, in alliance with the United States, exile and the old anti-European. They have no weapons, but of power resources, your service made by States and organizations with tools and means of long range, making war by other means.
Secondly, what experience teaches about the fact that government put in the pillory? Even Cubans who could be considered inefficient policy toward dissidents would be able to argue that they should pardon right now, under pressure from vested interests that block and its dual standards. The Government of the island has ever negotiated under pressure, even during the Cuban Missile Crisis, it would be unlikely to be doing so now.
Part of this political context is a certain perverse logic expressed in the question "what will make Cuba in exchange for ...?" Permission to travel to Cuban Americans, licensing corporations to sell food, signing of an agreement on drug trafficking. According to this logic, Cuba should pay a tribute to every little change in U.S. policy.
Hence, if you pardon the country consider the Five Cubans imprisoned for infiltrating exile, "tab negotiating "the only and obvious would be the dissidents sentenced as" agents of a foreign power. " Perverse logic, but logical at the end, the dissidents are pawns in the power board faced. It is difficult to imagine realistic changes in the treatment of them as long as there is a closed box. Will admit
Cuban socialism in the future, along with a renewed democratic institutions, a decentralized system, a non-state sector, also a loyal opposition within the system? That's not a question for Congress and MEPs, but for Cubans who live their future on the island.
(Source Process / Rebellion / The Jiribilla)
By Rafael Hernandez - CUBA Journalists.
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