Executive Summary This year's survey LAPOP Chile 2010, belonging to the Barometer of the Americas, included a series of thematic and methodological developments. In this summary we discuss first major technical innovations, and then main results. Along with these innovations remained the essential features of the sampling procedure used in 2006 and 2008, by sampling with rural and urban coverage, representing the non-institutionalized population over 18 years of age, by conducting face to face interviews. However, in 2010 the sample was applied by a process completely random (ie without the use of sex and age quotas as the samples applied in 2006 and 2008). The survey was conducted between April 23 and 11
June 2010, and 1965 have completed questionnaires.
In terms of methodological innovation is the first time our surveys were
conducted using PDAs. This not only ensure the highest standards of fieldwork and supervision, but also facilitated the integration of two experiments integrated into the survey (one to estimate the incidence of "vote buying" in the past campaign, and one for estimating the price elasticity voter turnout.) Both produced results that we review below.
addition, following the earthquake and tsunami of 27 February 2010, decided to make a comparison
(substantive results are discussed in Chapter VIII) between areas with high incidence of earthquake damage, and less affected areas. This resulted in the use of an over-sample of 400 cases , located in the southern and northern (Appendix I provides a detailed discussion of the procedure sampling and data collection). Finally, also for incorporation study on the effects of the earthquake, we use GPS units, which allow us locate the exact place where each of our interviews was conducted.
In substantive terms, the 2010 round of AmericasBarometer focused on the analysis of the political consequences and attitudes of the global economic crisis. Although the crisis eventually only partially affected the economies of the region, attempt to measure the impacts of different "crisis levels" and degrees of government capacity to cope with the negative effects of the recession exerted on a large complex attitudes. In the case of Chile, the results are , largely ruled by a positive tone.
While the country was one of the objectively most affected by the crisis in the Southern Cone, the real economic impact , and perceptions of crisis were muted. This "fading" appears to be attributable to counter-cyclical management undertaken by the government of President Michelle Bachelet during the last months of 2008 and mainly in 2009. The macroeconomic measures and the injection of resources saved in upturns in the economy were complemented by the implementation of social policies and a broad program of social protection.
In this context, our findings indicate that approval of the government of Michelle Bachelet followed a reverse pattern than usual. This applies doubly. For First, it is a government that began as relatively poorly assessed and that ended up being the best evaluation of history (from instruments we have reliable public opinion). In comparative terms, the management of crisis by the Chilean government is best assessed from the twenty-six countries that make our barometer. On the other hand, it is a government that was poorly evaluated during times of economic prosperity, and well tested in the midst of the recession mainly in 2009. While about 20% of respondents reported having experienced a decreased level of income during the last twelve months (possibly attributable to the impacts of the crisis), most Chileans considered the crisis there, but it was not serious. Moreover, unlike what
found at the regional level, only 2% of respondents attributed the blame for the crisis to the government, being the main culprits, "the international economic system" and "capitalism."
High presidential approval, has in turn, a number of significant correlates. On the one hand, find relative increases, although the vast majority of significant court cases in support political system, the legitimacy of democracy and satisfaction with its performance. For other hand, also reported significant decreases in perceived levels of public insecurity in crime victimization, and in terms of perceptions and levels of corruption victimization.
latter being usually low in Chile, the reduction is even more surprising. assessment of local governments is also very good.
The reduction in the perception and victimization by crime is not only encouraging since
standpoint of public safety, but also to supporting democracy as political. Particularly this is important because a high crime scenario is that it generates, abstract greater degrees of tolerance to a possible coup. For its part, is also important to note that in a context where most of the political and social institutions maintain similar levels of confidence in the Chilean population over time, confidence in the justice system has increased significant.
clearly positive in this context, our study also raises a number of challenges for Chilean democracy. The data show, eloquently, the consolidation of democracy "low intensity" in the country, characterized by very low levels of interest in politics (the lowest found throughout the region), very low comparative levels of participation in consultation processes local level, and also the lowest levels in the region in terms of sympathy with the political parties and voter registration. The latter also show a strong stratification age range, since a very high proportion of young Chileans are not registered to vote and have low levels interest in politics.
One possible interpretation of these trends is to think of Chile as a case "post-materialist
" in which politics has lost centrality in terms of economic development and growing prosperity . While some of the data that we can support this hypothesis, other interpretations suggest less benevolent. In particular, we suggest that the Chilean party system is disconnected from the citizenship. This coincides with the weakening of electoral mobilization based on current comprehensive program, and the gradual consolidation of personal leadership. The data presented about voting patterns in the last election suggest that candidates who achieved be seen as "less supportive", told with significant competitive advantages over more traditional candidates . To consolidate this trend, new windows of opportunity for movements "anti-politicians" could be opened. Meanwhile, political identities forged in the transition, and structured about the Alliance for Chile and the Coalition of Parties for Democracy gradually move to a smaller proportion (and in the most literal sense, in the process of extinction ) of the electorate.
A local government level also describes an ambiguous situation. On the one hand, their
authorities are directly elected by citizens and are responsible for important social policies, as education and health. On the other, are embedded in a highly polity centralized and in a country where the returns process planning and promoting the participation local have, at best, timid impulses. Equally ambiguous are the attitudes of Chilean respect to local political arena, featuring on the one hand an average level of requests made to the local authority, and being on the other hand, the least involved in consultative bodies ; citizen in local governance. Regarding their satisfaction with local management, citizenship Chilean located, in comparison, in una posición relativamente favorable, aunque estratificada socialmente. Esto último denota otra contradicción. Quienes más necesitan y recurren a la municipalidad (los sectores pobres), parecen tener niveles de satisfacción relativamente más bajos que quienes solucionan sus problemas y necesidades por otras vías (comprando prestaciones de mayor calidad en el mercado).
La posibilidad de contar con una sobremuestra que nos permite comparar entre regiones con alto y bajo impacto del terremoto del February 27, 2010 and the tsunamis that followed, allowed us to estimate impact in the evaluation of a series of political and social institutions such natural disasters. While some of the findings presented in this regard are those of Chilean case (eg, low specific approval of the actions of ONEMI, or negative impact of witnessing looting in nearby home on the evaluation of different institutions), others allow us to speculate on the impact of such generic phenomenon the public. This is what they do, in Chapter VIII of the report, Elizabeth Zechmeister, Ryan Carlin, and Gregory Love.
The two chapters (IX and X) directly by the local team of the Institute of Political Science at the PUC (led by Juan Pablo Luna and composed by Hector Bahamonde, Germain Bidegain, Roody ; Reserve and Giancarlo Visconti) focus on describing the structural dynamics (IX) and cyclical (X) that seem to have determined the election result 2010. This result is highly relevant because it has generated , after 20 years of hegemony of the Coalition, executive alternation for a candidate of the Alliance for Chile (Coalition for Change). In addition to this result, the electoral process realize that in Chapter X also reflects some relatively worrying trends about the "health" of the Chilean party system.
In this context, reports on the results of two experiments integrated questionnaire of AmericasBarometer applied in Chile. The first of these experiments attempted, through a method "list experiment" to estimate the magnitude of vote buying in the last election. not find in the country is significant evidence regarding the impact of this practice that it has been verified in other Latin American cases through the application of equivalent techniques. That said, our results indicate that the type of "gift" that the candidates made last season consisted essentially in the distribution of electoral merchandising.
also found no clear evidence about the electoral impact of the implementation of
social conditional cash transfer programs. In the case of Chile, unlike what we reported for other cases in the region, who receive a social policy of this kind are not more likely to participate in elections or electoral support to the government. Nor have significantly higher levels of sympathy with the ruling parties.
The second experiment we included in our survey, structured on the basis of
technique known as contingent valuation method, estimates the price elasticity of the right to vote in three successive elections. In this case the results are significant and eventually concern. Contrary to what might be expected, we find that the income of the person not have a significant impact on the "selling the right to vote" in exchange for monetary compensation.
However, find significant evidence regarding the influence of age of the person in their propensity to give up their right to participate in choosing their elected representatives. the Chilean youth, who actually participate in the electoral game to a much lesser rate than their older compatriots are significantly more likely to change their political rights by a compensation. As argued in Chapter X, the strength and persistence of such attitudes of Chilean youth puts into question the potential impact that isolation is often attributed to different institutional reform proposals currently under discussion in the country (as the current discussion registration system transformation voluntary / compulsory voting in one of automatic enrollment and voluntary voting .) In conclusion, our data suggest that the problem of political participation, as well as the progressive distancing between political parties and citizens respond to dynamic not only institutional, but rather to more complex structural and resolution.
In summary, our report is scheduled for a strong contradiction. On the one hand, introduce a long series of good news regarding the recent development of attitudes regarding Chilean political system and society in which they live. In comparative terms, both in time, as regional level, these findings are very promising.
On the other hand, we also presented a dark diagnosis regarding the operation of some dimensions institutional Chilean political system. In particular, the progressive consolidation of democracy "low intensity", especially in social sectors will soon be a majority in the country (youth) is a sign of alarm. In turn, the configuration of a party system highly stable, closed at the level of political elites, but increasingly alienated from the citizenship also alarming. In this context, the public has a greater tendency to lean options "nonpartisan" , decoupled from the traditional political elite. At the same time, the alignments of the past structured identity fields related to the two major political pacts
dominate the electoral game, are becoming increasingly safe when electorally mobilize new generations who join the public (though not the electoral game.)
Ultimately, we hope this report will prove a useful input to better identify
chiaroscuro contemporary Chilean political system and its operation (At least from the point of view public opinion), and well able to guide the search for tools that allow us to build a democracy fuller and better quality.
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